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INTRODUCTION
There are few comprehensive surveys address-
ing the evolution of China’s grassland policies, par-
ticularly with respect to fencing. This paper presents 
the national-level laws and regulations that structure 
China’s contemporary property regimes and directly 
affect the ongoing enclosure movement in pastoral 
areas, with a focus on Tibetan populations. Having 
reviewed the legal and political framework for en-
closure on the Tibetan Plateau, we will argue that 
the intent and sequencing of development policies 
in pastoral areas is based on an overriding logic of 
modernization, privatization, and intensification (Yeh 
2005). This logic, in turn, has been used to promote 
enclosure and rationalize heavy investments in tech-
nologies of control — policies that reflect the state’s 
political goals in Tibetan areas and which may have 
unintended consequences, including increased graz-
ing and degradation of the very rangeland resources 
that are putatively being protected by enclosures.1 
Rather than addressing critical socio-economic con-
straints in pastoral areas such as population pressures, 
migration, labor access, and market distortions (Shen 
2004), policymakers have instead focused on techni-
cal interventions (e.g., reseeding, livestock breeding) 
1. c.f. Yeh 2009; Williams 1996b; Jahiel 1997; Muldavin 
2000; Ho 2001a; Harris 2010
without recognizing the integrated nature of the chal-
lenges confronting Tibetan nomads as they undergo 
rapid shifts in their socio-economic situation. 
It is germane to reiterate the importance of these 
grasslands, which can hardly be exaggerated: range-
land resources include 400 million hectares—more 
than 40 percent of China’s land (Schwarzwalder et al. 
2002). Of that, Tibetan Plateau rangelands encom-
pass about 1.65 million km2 or one-quarter of China’s 
total area (Miller 2001). The PRC has 266 pastoral 
and semi-pastoral counties accounting for 161.5 mil-
lion people, who herd the world’s largest population 
of sheep and goats along with other livestock (Liu 
2010; Williams 1996).2 In addition to supporting 
millions of pastoralists, Tibetan rangelands provide 
critical ecosystem services. China’s water supply is 
dependent on Tibet’s grasslands, which are the source 
of its major rivers. Many of these river systems are 
crucial to countries other than China, so the manage-
ment of these watersheds is of global import. While 
little studied, the carbon storage capacity of the 
world’s largest expanse of grasslands—and its con-
comitant effects on the global climate—must also be 
given emphasis. Tibet’s grasslands also support many 
rare and endemic species of fauna and flora.
Economically, China’s western pastoral regions are 
2. There are 120 “pure pastoral” counties in China compris-
ing almost 63 million people.
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this paper, the term “enclosure” is meant in the literal sense, 
i.e., the enclosure of land by barbed wire fencing or other 
means. Please note that “enclosure” is often a misnomer be-
cause fencing is used just as frequently for exclosure, i.e., to 
keep animals out of grazing areas. Regardless, “enclosure” has 
other dimensions. Specifically, China’s contemporary enclo-
sure movement must be considered within a broader set of 
historical arguments, as exemplified by the economic sub-
stantivists who adopted Polanyi’s assertions that markets are 
embedded in society. Polanyi (1944) argued that the enclo-
sure of common lands in England was a political and social 
process that led to the commoditization of land, which was a 
necessary precursor to industrialization.5 
Applying this notion to the enclosure movement on the 
Tibetan Plateau is complicated. On the one hand, the process 
of fencing and long-term title to land may be a precursor to 
the wholesale commoditization of rangelands in Tibet. We 
anticipate that, within a generation, there will be a broad-
scale consolidation of land holdings and the growth of large, 
privately held ranches. 
On the other hand, the enclosure process in contempo-
rary China differs in important ways from historical England 
in that: (1) the state still owns rangelands in China [T-1, 14, 
15, 22, 23]; (2) fencing on the Tibetan Plateau subdivides 
pastures at the household level creating a rather inefficient 
basis for commoditization and consolidation of these lands; 
(3) in areas where caterpillar fungus is available for harvest 
and a viable economic option [see Sułek this volume], we do 
not anticipate that Tibetans would willingly sell or relinquish 
their land parcels; (4) leasing is a viable economic option for 
many Tibetans, particularly livestock poor households, and 
there is little incentive for them to sell their land if they can 
continue to rent it. These aforementioned factors counteract 
any preordained movement toward the commercialization of 
Tibetan rangelands. While it is not possible to resolve this 
argument here, raising these issues helps to contextualize the 
enclosure movement reviewed here and underscores the im-
portance — economic, political, and social — of this ongoing 
process for Tibetan pastoralists and the Chinese nation as a 
whole.
THE INTRODUCTION OF FENCING ON THE 
TIBETAN PLATEAU 
Barbed wire fencing, which physically, socially, and sym-
bolically demarcates territory, has seen expanding use since it 
was first installed in the early 1960s as an experiment at In-
ner Mongolia’s Wushenzhao (Uxin Ju) Commune; this com-
mune was later trumpeted as a national model for intensifying 
pastoral production (Williams 1996). Its use then expanded 
to other pastoral areas such as Ningxia (Ho 2000). Fencing 
began on a small scale in Tibetan areas of Qinghai, Gansu, 
Yunnan, and Sichuan Provinces during the commune period 
5. Enclosure is more advanced in agricultural China. Anthropologist Li 
Zhang calls land expropriation the “new enclosure movement,” and describes 
it as ‘accumulation by dispossession’ (Zhang 2010). 
characterized by heterogeneous and geographically dispersed 
resources and rudimentary markets (Brown et al. 2008). The 
economic development of these areas poses a formidable chal-
lenge to the Chinese government. Poverty incidence among 
livestock-dependent people is among the highest in China, 
with large numbers of nomads living below the poverty line 
(Mearns 2004).3 Reportedly, more than a third of pastoral 
households in Qinghai Province live below the poverty line 
(Wageningen and Wenjun 2001). Given their importance as 
a source of livelihoods and provisioner of environmental ser-
vices—not to mention their ethnic makeup, demography, and 
current state of development—it behooves us to scrutinize 
the national-level regulations and policies affecting the enclo-
sure movement on China’s grasslands. 
Pastoralism is long-lived in Tibet — e.g., archaeologi-
cal evidence dates the domestication of yaks to 4,000 years 
ago. Therefore, we must recognize that cultural institutions, 
livelihood practices, wildlife and plant communities have 
co-evolved on the Plateau (Miller 2000). As such, there are 
continuities in patterns of resource use, animal husbandry 
strategies, and property regimes among Tibetan pastoralists, 
which China’s recent political and economic reforms have not 
wholly transformed. 
Authors should explain their methods in compiling a re-
view like this. Between 2007 and 2010, the first author was 
a member of a multi-national and multi-disciplinary team 
funded by the European Commission to examine the effects 
of fencing on livestock productivity, wildlife, vegetation, and 
the socio-economic situation of pastoralists on the Tibetan 
Plateau.4 This research consisted of a literature review; in-
terviews with provincial and county-level grassland officials 
in western China; participant observation as well as partial 
results from a survey administered in three pastoral counties 
in Gansu, Sichuan, and Qinghai Provinces; and personal ob-
servations based on years of working and traveling in pasto-
ral Tibet. Translations of relevant Chinese language sources 
on grassland legislation and regulations were completed by 
Yonten Nyima. In what follows, we will cross-reference our 
observations and assertions about enclosure with the relevant 
laws and regulations, which will be noted according to the 
row in which they are located, for example, the notation “T-1, 
5” refers the reader to rows 1 and 5 in Table 1.
This paper reviews China’s rangeland policies, particularly 
those relevant to enclosure, since the implementation of the 
Household Responsibility System in the 1980s. Throughout 
3. Standard income measures are not well conceived to capture sub-
sistence or asset-based wealth, particularly in the case of Tibetan nomads. 
Fischer (2008) notes that their relative asset wealth (i.e., number of livestock/
household) trumps their relative income poverty when it comes to the factors 
influencing economic behavior. That is, the animal assets and, therefore, sub-
sistence capacity which Tibetan nomads and farmers retain are better indica-
tors than income measures of household wealth and the factors underlying 
Tibetans’ economic decisions. 
4. Rangeland Enclosure on the Tibetan Plateau (RETPEC), funded by 
the European Commission under FP6 Specific Targeted Research Project, 
Contract number INCO-CT-2006-032350.
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(1967-1980), when pastoral communities began to set aside 
and enclose their most fertile meadows as communal reserves 
for winter grazing and hay harvesting. The first fencing in 
the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) was installed in the late 
1960s in the Damshung Valley (north of Lhasa), a “model” 
demonstration area due to its proximity to the capital.
During the commune period, the government pushed for 
enclosures in Tibet’s nomadic communities, obliging pastoral 
collectives to build sod walls to conserve winter pastures as 
well as develop hay-harvesting areas. The harvesting of sod 
to construct these walls led to significant soil damage; in par-
ticular, surface mining of the grassland turf caused the break-
down of root systems, making soil more erodible. Regardless, 
commune members were compelled to build these enclosures 
in order to earn work points for food rations and other neces-
sities. Building these walls—much less maintaining them—
was exhausting and time-consuming; they are invariably 
crumbling, often in parallel to today’s barbed wire fencing. 
The construction of permanent houses and animal shel-
ters began in earnest during the 1980s, when nomads were 
encouraged to build houses near their traditional wintering 
grounds with government subsidies. Currently, that process 
is oriented towards the creation of “new socialist villages” for 
Tibetan nomads and the construction of concentrated hous-
ing along transportation nodes.6
THE ENCLOSURE MOVEMENT IN THE REFORM ERA
Since the 1980s, the central government has attempted to 
convert extensive range systems throughout pastoral China 
into producing more intensively for the market using en-
closed pastures, irrigated forage production, and improved 
breeding techniques (Williams 1996a, 2002; Clarke 1987). In 
the Tibetan context, enclosure by fencing has been the com-
monest means of trying to achieve these ends. 
Pastoral production in Tibet depends on controlling ac-
cess to and maintaining the productivity of winter pastures. 
The government focused first on these seasonal resources 
and heavily subsidized fencing in winter leaseholds, lamb-
ing pastures and fodder plantations. These reserve pastures 
and forage production areas help reduce the risk of livestock 
losses by reserving grass for lean seasons and providing fod-
der during critical bottlenecks in the production cycle. Still, 
summer and autumn pastures remained largely unfenced, as 
the government expected that livestock numbers would reach 
a “natural maximum” based on the limits of each household’s 
winter fodder.
One of the main goals of the Household Responsibility 
System (HRS) was to provide incentives by giving families 
long-term leases to grasslands (Levine 1998, 1999). The pas-
ture contracts issued through the HRS identified the areas 
over which a household had private rights and specified that 
land’s capacity for supporting livestock. In theory, the imple-
6. For in-depth discussions of the impacts of collectivization in Tibetan 
pastoral areas, see Goldstein and Beall (1998) and Bauer (2008).
mentation of this contract system took place in three phases: 
1) surveying of rangeland boundaries at the village and town-
ship level; 2) issuance of pasture use contracts by the county 
government; 3) distribution of pasture contracts to house-
holds by the administrative village (Ho 2000). HRS contracts 
defined the grazing areas for households on winter pastures 
and in household pens but summer grasslands were still typi-
cally grazed communally by herds of combined households. 
This facilitated group grazing and ensured access to water 
points and stock routes shared by collective units.
According to Miller (1998), Chinese government policy 
for privatization of grassland is based on the mistaken belief 
that traditional systems did not give nomads any responsibil-
ity for rangelands and, thus, households tried to maximize 
herd sizes without concern for the grassland ecosystem. In 
fact, traditional Tibetan systems were often well managed and 
had elaborate regulations to periodically reallocate grazing, 
depending on the number of seasonal pastures (Bauer 2008; 
Goldstein and Beall 1991; Goldstein et al. 2003). While the 
HRS granted households full rights to livestock, the rights to 
land were still collectively held (Goldstein and Beall 1989, 
2002; Manderscheid 2001). This created a basic paradox at 
the heart of the reforms in pastoral areas: because the rights to 
grazing lands are held jointly by the household, it has become 
increasingly difficult to divide pastures among one’s children 
and to support herd division among subsequent generations. 
Moreover, the HRS allotments have generally not been up-
dated, with pressures burgeoning (Bauer 2005). Critical to 
the enclosure process has been a series of laws and regula-
tions, detailed in Table 1 below, that funded the institutions 
and provided the bureaucratic rationale for enclosure and the 
shift toward privatization. 
The first Grassland Law of the PRC was enacted in 1985 
[T-2]. There is no explicit mention of enclosure or fencing in 
this nationwide law. Of course, fencing had been installed in 
various parts of the Tibetan Plateau long before this, which 
lends some credence to the notion that the enclosure move-
ment has its roots, to some extent, in social and economic 
movements at the grassroots level rather than being a func-
tion of government initiative. The 1985 Grassland Law pro-
vided a general framework for the allocation of grasslands 
and the division of land which fences instantiate. This law 
establishes the basis for household land use rights: it allows 
contracts between the collective and individual households, 
and grants exclusive usufruct rights to winter grazing sites. 
Initially, families were given 30-year leases over their pasture 
allotments, which were subsequently extended to 50 years 
(Ho 1996, 2001b). Though some have argued for recognition 
of group title (Ho 1988; Yan et al 2005; Banks 2002; Banks 
et al. 2003), there is no provision in the 1985 Grassland Law 
to account for group activities. The subsequent Land Admin-
istration Laws [T-3,5,6] as well as the 1988 PRC Constitution 
[T-4] and other regulations [T-21,27] provide for the titling 
of rangelands to collective units. Even as it prescribed the 
division of grasslands to households, this first grassland law 
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that, by 2010, China wants to fence 100 million ha more 
of its grassland, including a total of 28 million hectares on 
the Tibetan Plateau. In 2020, the government plans to have 
fenced off 150 million hectares of grasslands nationwide, with 
a total 900 million planned by 2020.7 Still, even as millions of 
hectares were being fenced, there was no central directive that 
mentioned enclosure. 
Since the 1990s, Chinese government policy with re-
spect to grasslands has assumed that these resources are be-
ing squandered (Williams 1997, 2000; Sneath 1998, 2000). 
Presuming that rangeland degradation is widespread and ac-
celerating, economic arguments in favor of privatization have 
been prominently employed to rationalize China’s grassland 
administration and resource use policies (Banks 2002, 2003; 
Ho 2000b; Sneath 2002). The Chinese government empha-
sized the idea that degradation of grasslands could only be 
avoided by strengthening the pasture contract system (Ho 
2000a, 2001b; Thwaites et al. 1998). Xu and Qiu (1995) 
write, “The core of reform in the grasslands must be to intro-
duce a kind of contract responsibility system which would 
increase the worth of the land in the eyes of those who live on 
it, and persuade them to protect the grasslands by convinc-
ing them that the grass is their living, as well as their fodder” 
(quoted in Williams 2002: 31). 
Government policymakers proposed that privatization 
would increase users’ incentives to invest in better manage-
ment because common property systems lacked such incen-
tives (Miller 1998). Privatization is not only touted by govern-
ment planners as more efficient, but also fits within the larger 
modernization framework of free enterprise and entrepre-
neurship strongly advocated by the World Bank (Ho 2001b). 
International development organizations thus directly and 
indirectly influenced the discourse of privatization (Williams 
2002). 
The strategy of privatizating communal pastures has been 
tried worldwide under the pretext of preventing degradation 
(c.f. de Queiroz 1993). Neoliberal economists and planners 
assert that rural productivity and the environment are threat-
ened in the absence of property rights. However, privatiza-
tion does not guarantee conservative rangeland management 
or wise stewardship (Little and Brokensha 1987). Regardless, 
the premise of widespread grassland degradation and the pos-
ited need for privatization have lead Chinese policymakers to 
the conclusion that stocking rates must be lowered in pastoral 
areas (Ho 2000b). 
Privatization policies were designed to turn Tibet’s com-
munal, extensive rangeland grazing system into industrial-
ized ranch-based production that relies on enclosed pastures, 
grows fodder, feeds animals in stalls, and delivers meat to 
ready markets. Should intensification succeed, it must take la-
bor off Tibet’s rangelands. But can more nomads be absorbed 
7. “General plans for grassland protection, development (jianshe) and 
use” (quanguo caoyuan baohu jianshe liyong zongti guihua) http://www.
forestry.gov.cn/uploadfile/main/2010-11/file/2010-11-26-e1c16284c5aa4f-
a396c2756a4d3a9971.pdf
did not address pasture management. It envisioned that, after 
land allocation, a system of incentives and sanctions would 
enforce compliance with the government-assessed stocking 
rates (Mearns 2004). Notably, in the 1985 Grassland Law, 
the state gave itself the mandate and authority to set stocking 
rates for different types of grasslands. 
Since the 1990s, “Grassland Responsibility and Man-
agement Certificates” have been issued to herders, typically 
households with larger herds. Responsibilities under these 
contracts include improving the condition of grasslands. The 
establishment of this system has, however, been problematic 
according to pastoralists and government officials alike. These 
grassland use certificates do not clearly delineate household 
boundaries; there are no maps or cadastral surveys to con-
firm grazing areas. Even where long-term (50-years) leases 
have been allocated, and fencing has created exclusive graz-
ing, it is not clear that privatized rights to grasslands will lead 
to efficient and sustainable practices. Rather, fifty-year leases 
constrain the free movement of assets, which can be a major 
impediment to efficient production. The assumption is that 
private property rights are required to optimize resource use. 
However, the current system results in widespread leasing be-
tween households in the absence of a more complete land 
market (Ho and Lin 2003) [T-9, 23, 24, 26]. 
Leasing can create perverse incentives and lead to un-
intended outcomes: lessees have little incentive to invest in 
grasslands or use them sustainably, a problem compounded 
by the usually short-term (1 year) nature of the leases. Such 
imperfections in the land rental market mean that lessees will 
have incentives to overstock and run down rented land rela-
tive to their own contracted pastures. A more widespread, ro-
bust, and legally enforced system for leasing land is needed 
to overcome these problems. In the meantime, significant 
numbers of poor pastoral households currently lease out 
their land, often without access to alternative forms of income 
(Manderscheid and Naukkarinen 2004). This raises issues of 
policy sequencing where, for example, vocational training 
would precede out-migration for labor or leases would be co-
ordinated with appropriate management policies. 
In the 1990s, rates of enclosure accelerated: a tipping point 
in favor of fencing was reached. A government White Paper 
on the Development-oriented Poverty Reduction Program for 
Rural China boasted that between 1994 and 1999, 6.72 mil-
lion mu of grassland in autonomous areas (including “TAR” 
and the Tibetan prefectures) had been fenced (Information 
Office 2001). Total fenced grassland in China increased from 
just 52 million mu (~3.5 million ha) in 1985 to 450 million 
mu (30 million ha) in 2004. The Tenth Five Year Plan (2001-
2005) set the goal of fencing an additional 150 million mu (10 
million ha) of China’s pastures (Miller 2001). By 2008, China 
had fenced off a total of 62 million hectares, which is the 
latest figure (Ministry of Agriculture 2009a). On the Tibetan 
Plateau alone, almost a million hectares of grassland had been 
fenced by 2005.
A recent Ministry of Forestry (2009b) document states 
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into China’s labor markets? Alongside Chinese migrants and 
increasing numbers of rural Tibetans who are being pushed 
(e.g., resettlement) or pulled (e.g., migration for labor or edu-
cation) into settlements and urban areas, can nomads com-
pete? Government planners have failed to tackle the real di-
lemma of how to provide incentives for proper management 
of land resources in ways that ensure long-term rangeland 
productivity amidst rapid socio-economic and demographic 
change (Ho 2001b).
The 2002 Grassland Law emphasizes stocking rates [T-
7] and related measures [T-8], creating various challenges. 
These include having up-to-date and accurate measures of 
grassland productivity; accounting for seasonal and inter-year 
variations; policing stocking rates and associated fines. Stock-
ing rates often fail to account for area specific and climatic 
variations and are, therefore, an inappropriate basis on which 
to regulate household grazing. In their nationwide survey of 
China’s rangeland areas, Brown et al. (2008) report that there 
is little enforcement at the local level of the stocking limits, 
nor are fines frequently given to those who exceed their as-
signed quota of animals.  
The first national document to mention fencing in relation 
to grassland protection and development was the “Sugges-
tions regarding strengthening grassland protection and con-
struction,” published in 2002 [T-8]. It suggests that grassland 
enclosures be undertaken both for pastoral development and 
for grassland protection. At the start of this decade, the im-
plementation of individual parcels and the enclosure of these 
grazing lands had reportedly been achieved in only a minority 
of China’s grazing regions (Ho 2000a). The authors’ field ob-
servations in Tibetan areas of Yunnan, Sichuan, and Qinghai 
Provinces as well as the Tibet Autonomous Region indicate 
that this has changed greatly in the past decade. Indeed, the 
contracting of grasslands to households is well advanced in 
Tibetan pastoral areas; for example, 90 percent of grasslands 
in Qinghai are reportedly contracted out (Schwarzwalder et 
al. 2002). Nationally, by mid 2009, a total of 220 million 
hectares had been contracted out (Ministry of Agriculture 
2009b). In sum, more than half of China’s usable grassland 
(55 percent) has been contracted out, with even higher pro-
portions in Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang and some Tibetan areas. 
THE ROLES OF FENCING OVER TIME
In the last 50 years, the management and social func-
tions of grassland enclosure have undergone several stages. 
Beginning in the 1960s, grassland enclosure was initiated in 
Inner Mongolia. Until the introduction of the household re-
sponsibility system in the early 1980s, grassland enclosures 
were used to reserve grass and fatten animals at herders’ own 
initiative. Since then, enclosure has seen increasing use by 
herders to establish the physical boundaries of their leasehold 
pastures: fencing is a de facto part of the household contract 
system in pastoral areas. 
Fences are seen as indicators of livestock production tech-
nology and socio-economic development (Yan et al. 2005). 
Fences are highly visible and tangible assets that are quick 
to deliver: the progress of fencing projects is easy to quantify 
against specified targets (Bauer 2005). As such, fencing is at-
tractive both to domestic policy makers and external agen-
cies. Fencing projects enable Beijing and provincial decision-
makers as well as external agencies to tie funding to labor, 
which gives them a level of control not normally available 
through other measures. For instance, fencing projects can 
be structured to provide funding conditional on local input, 
in this case, herders who provide most of the work to install 
barbed wire fencing.
THE CURRENT ENCLOSURE MOMENT
Through the mid-1990s, fencing served largely as a tool 
to reinforce and expand traditional enclosures for the purpose 
of reserving winter/spring feed and harvesting hay in autumn. 
Since then, fencing has been used to enforce a wholly new 
kind of territoriality that is driven by central government di-
rectives to exclude pastoralists from grasslands on the pre-
text of environmental conservation, particularly in (1) regions 
that have been heavily deforested by industrial concerns (e.g., 
Sichuan, Yunnan); (2) watersheds that are a source China’s 
major rivers (e.g., Qinghai); and (3) areas with significant po-
tential for hydropower development. Enclosure policies and 
funding streams act in political consort with sedentarization 
programs, mineral extraction pushes, and the imperative to 
privatize rangelands.
This current period started with the sipeitao jianshe, the 
“Comprehensive Set of Four Constructions” which promoted:
•	 fixed settlements (jianshe dingju dian) on winter 
pastures
•	 fenced areas (jianshe weilan)
•	 schools and health stations (jianshe xuexiao weish-
eng zhan)
•	 contracting of pastures to families (cheng bao 
caoyuan dao hu)
The “four ways” program and other national-level programs 
encourage and subsidize the building of houses for herders, 
rodent control, and shelters for livestock as well as additional 
fences and fodder plantations [T-16, 18, 19, 25]. This policy 
significantly altered the livelihoods of the pastoralists in af-
fected areas, especially since it was accompanied by a num-
ber of “Poverty Alleviation through Migration” (yimin fupin) 
schemes, which resettled nomads into county towns. After 
2000, enclosure was spearheaded by the government as inte-
gral to broader initiatives, especially the Xibu Dakaifa (“Chi-
na’s Western Development”) (c.f. Hongyi 2002). 
Aspects of the current enclosure movement can be seen as 
a continuation of previous fencing programs. From herders’ 
perspective, xiumu enclosures (grazing ban for several months 
annually) are similar to previous fencing initiatives in terms 
of their function, to reserve grass and fatten animals (Dong et 
al. 2007) [T-10]. However, in its push for the destocking of 
livestock, the “returning grazing to grassland” (tuimu huan-
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ment and an organizing tool used in pastoral environments 
the world over (Sullivan and Homewood 2003). Neo-liberal 
economists and government planners alike argue that fencing 
provides individual herders with security of property rights 
and, therefore, incentives to more sustainably manage and 
invest in their pastures. This argument, although based on 
shaky evidence, is frequently used to support expanding en-
closure (Harris 2010). Fencing in China’s Tibetan regions is 
today ultimately more about redistribution of resources and 
resettlement of pastoralists rather than about productivity or 
sustainable management of resources. 
 The current land market in pastures is neither com-
plete nor characterized by perfect information—conditions 
that, according to neoliberal economic logic, must exist in 
order for privatization to succeed. A (more) complete market 
in land—in which private rights to land are secure and guar-
anteed by the legal system—would make land transactions 
more efficient and consequently provide, hypothetically, the 
conditions for intensification of pastoral production. Howev-
er, there has been weak development of livestock markets in 
Tibetan areas. Still, central policy—which is reflected in the 
table of grassland laws and regulations presented here—con-
tinues to favor state and collective land ownership, which has 
resulted in a complex leasing system that makes consolida-
tion difficult. 
So far, policy makers have focused on the physical con-
straints (i.e., technical improvements) and neglected socio-
economic constraints such as population pressures, migra-
tion, labor access, and market distortions. Reflecting these 
priorities, the government’s key areas of activity in livestock 
development have been the establishment of demonstration 
centers focused on technology extension; the restoration of 
severely degraded grasslands (Xue et al. 2002); the protection 
of selected grasslands with strategic, economic, ecological, or 
other values; and subsidies for fencing and sown pastures. 
Even though today’s rangeland policies can appear on the sur-
face to be uncoordinated in intent and sequencing, the over-
riding logic of modernization, privatization, and intensifica-
tion drives China’s governance goals in developing Tibetan 
pastoral areas. 
There is no unitary explanation of how and why the laws 
and regulations reviewed here were created and carried out. 
Rather, complex phenomena like governance and the exercise 
of power, especially in multi-cultural societies such as China, 
require approaches that are both diachronic and synchronic. 
Hopefully, this review provides a foundation for enhanced 
understanding of these processes and a framework within 
which further empirical work can be completed.
cao), and the government’s sweeping resettlement projects 
[T-11,12,13,17,20] are, not surprisingly, seen as qualitatively 
and quantitatively different than previous enclosure policies.
In sum, the enclosure movement in Tibetan areas has un-
dergone discrete but overlapping stages: 
1. Traditional practices, in which certain pastures were 
seasonally reserved and defended through boundary 
demarcation, seasonal mobility, and socially rein-
forced sanctions (pre-1950s). 
2. Enclosures used to reserve grass at herders’ initia-
tive. Such enclosures were supported by the Animal 
Husbandry Bureau, including experimental stations 
and technical extension agents.
3. Enclosures created during the Household Respon-
sibility System that were used to establish physical 
boundaries of private pastures, especially in winter 
areas.
4. Enclosures that serve as tools for broader, orches-
trated national development projects (e.g., airports, 
railroads, roads, other eminent domain projects) and 
for political control (i.e., sedentarization and reset-
tlement, direct control of resource priority areas like 
headwaters and minerals), rationalized as necessary 
steps for environmental protection. 
The grassland enclosure polices reviewed here overlap nat-
urally. Nevertheless, the current enclosure program—the 
grazing removal project (tuimu huancao)—aims to remove 
pastoralists’ from grassland resources to reverse purported 
grassland degradation; the previous phases of enclosure fo-
cused on reserving grass and providing physical boundaries, 
without restricting nomads’ use of rangelands.
Various local governments in Tibetan areas have imple-
mented policies quite differently (Yangzong 2006; Bauer 
2005; Yan et al. 2005; Yeh 2003; Wu and Richard 1999). This 
paper is based in part on snapshots of these local differences 
in governance and policy implementation. There are signifi-
cant disjunctures between policy setting and effective imple-
mentation. At the grassroots level, contradictions between the 
stated intent of the programs and the way they are imple-
mented are common, reflecting the divergent incentives and 
maneuvering room local officials have. 
CONCLUSIONS
In both theory and practice, fencing plays an important 
role in livestock and grassland management. Fences are part 
of the rationalizing discourse of modern livestock manage-
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Table 1: Laws and Regulations Affecting the Enclosure of Rangelands in Tibetan Areas of China
Law/Regulation Date Key Provisions
1 PRC Constitution1 1982 •	 Rural land is either owned by collectives or by the State (Article 10).
2 Grassland Law2 1985 •	 The Department of Agriculture and Animal Husbandry shall be in charge of grassland adminis-
tration nationwide (Article 3).
•	 All grasslands in the PRC are state owned; grasslands may be contracted by collectives or indi-
viduals for pastoral production (Article 4).
•	 Department of Agriculture and Animal Husbandry shall be in charge of nationwide grassland 
administration.
•	 Grassland users are allowed to use others’ grasslands based upon mutual understandings and 
for the purpose of public benefit under special circumstances such as in the event of natural 
disasters (Article 5).
•	 Disputes between groups (collectives) over ownership and use rights of grasslands should be 
handled by county level governments and those between groups and individuals and between 
individuals should be handled by township or county governments (Article 6).
•	 Grassland reclamation must be approved by county level (or above) governments (Article 10).
•	 The harvest of medicinal plants and exploitation of natural resources found on grasslands must 
be agreed upon by grassland users and approved by township or county level government. 
(Article 11).
•	 Allows leasing of rangeland use rights to individual households.
3 Land Administration 
Law3
1986 •	 Both collectively owned and state owned land can be contracted to collectives or individuals for 
pastoral production (Article 12).
•	 If land is taken by the state, compensation for use rights and settlement allowance should be 
paid to land users (Article 28).
4 Amendment to the 
Constitution 4
1988 •	 Explicitly states that land use rights may be transferred by law.
5 Land Administration 
Law5
1988 •	 Use rights of both state and collectively owned land may be transferred by law.
6 Land Administration 
Law6
1998 •	 Divided land into three categories: agricultural land, land for construction, and unused land, 
which aimed to limit the transfer of agricultural land to land for construction and thereby pre-
serve farming land.
7 Grassland Law7 2002 •	 Key regulations derived from the Grassland Law include: Basic Grasslands Protection Regula-
tions; Grazing Bans and Restrictions Administrative Regulations; Autumn and Spring Grassland 
Vegetation Fee Collection, Use and Management Measures; Grassland Survey and Statistics 
Administrative Regulations.
•	 Provides for the establishment of a nationwide system of monitoring and inspection agencies 
along with stiffer penalties to curb reclamation, encroachment, overgrazing were included.
•	 Placed greater emphasis on environmental protection and conservation of biodiversity than its 
predecessor.
•	 Grassland administration was extended to township governments who were assigned responsibil-
ity for the supervision, inspection, protection, and development of grasslands (Article 8).
1. Xian fa (1982), http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2008-01/24/content_1381976.htm 
2. Caoyuan fa (1985), http://www.tgenviron.org/policylaw/law/grassland.htm; http://www.china.org.cn/environment/2007-08/20/content_1034338.htm 
3. Tudi guanli fa (1986), http://www.nmql.com/ShowArticle.shtml?ID=20078281463867013.htm 
4. Xian fa xiuzheng an (1988), http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Constitution/node_2829.htm; http://www.law-lib.com/law/law_view.asp?id=204 
5. Tudi guanli fa (1988), http://www.law-lib.com/law/law_view.asp?id=95544
6. Tudi guanli fa (1998), http://www.law-lib.com/law/law_view.asp?id=419 
7. Caoyuan fa (2002), http://law.chinalawinfo.com/newlaw2002/slc/slc.asp?db=chl&gid=44354; http://www.gov.cn/english/laws/2005-10/09/content_75387.
htm  
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7 Grassland Law8
[continued]
2002 •	 Grasslands (state owned or collectively owned) may be contracted to households individually or 
jointly within the collectives. No adjustment may be made to the contracted grasslands within the 
term of contract unless approved by township governments and grassland administrative depart-
ments at the county level (Article 13). 
•	 Grassland use rights may be transferred and subcontracted for pastoral production within the 
original term of contracts (Article 15). 
•	 County level (or above) governments should encourage herders to build up grassland fences, 
livestock shelters, settlements, and reserve grass and fodder as initiatives to develop production 
and living facilities (Article 28).
•	 Grassland users should not exceed livestock carrying capacity determined by grassland adminis-
trative departments. The standard for livestock carrying capacity and the balance between grass 
yields and livestock numbers shall be determined by grassland administrative department under 
the State Council (Article 33). 
•	 Rotation grazing and raising livestock in pens are encouraged (Articles 34, 35). Raising livestock 
in pens (especially in farming and semi-pastoral areas) was encouraged (Article 35).
•	 Grassland use for mineral resource exploitation and construction is subject to the approval of 
provincial level (and above) governments (Article 38).
•	 Compensation for collectively owned grasslands (use rights) taken for construction should be 
made according to the land administrative law; compensation for state owned grasslands (use 
rights) taken for construction should be made according to relevant regulations of the State Coun-
cil (Article 39).
•	 Where grasslands are taken for construction, restoration fees should be collected by grassland 
administrative departments and used to restore vegetation (Article 39).
•	 The concept of carrying capacity was first at the national level in this law. Users should not exceed 
livestock carrying capacity determined by county level government agencies (Article 45). 
•	 Where grassland has been degraded severely and is fragile, grazing bans should be implemented 
(both short and long term) (jinmu/xiumu) (Article 47).
•	 Specific policies on the restoration of farmland to grassland and grazing bans would be made by 
the State Council and provincial (level) governments; compensation and subsidies for grass seeds 
will be paid in the form of grain or cash (Article 48).
•	 The term “grasslands” was extended to artificial grasslands including improved grasslands and 
restored grasslands from farming but excluded urban lands covered by grass (Article 74).
8 Suggestions regard-
ing strengthening 
grassland protection 
and construction 
(Document 19, State 
Council)9
2002 •	 States that 90 percent of China’s utilizable grassland has been degraded to various extents and that 
overgrazing has not been controlled. 
•	 Advocated measures such as the “Grain for Green” program as well as grazing ban and rest sys-
tems.
•	 Provisions for the establishment of a nationwide monitoring system and inspection agencies 
along with stiffer penalties to curb reclamation, encroachment, and overgrazing. Places greater 
emphasis on environmental protection and conservation of biodiversity than its predecessor 
(Grassland Law 1985). For example, the penalty for grassland violations changed from simply 
“stopping illegal behavior, compensating for the losses, restoring vegetation or imposing a fine” to 
imprisonment for various offences.
•	 States that rotational grazing, short-term grazing bans (xiumu) in spring and fall, and long-term 
grazing bans in fragile and degraded areas should be implemented. Local governments should 
devise feasible plans for rotational and grazing bans according to local conditions. Restoration 
of farmland to grassland and the restoration of degraded grassland should be focused on river 
source areas and sandstorm source areas. This central government document became the guide-
line for the grazing removal project (tuimu huancao).
8. Caoyuan fa (2002), http://law.chinalawinfo.com/newlaw2002/slc/slc.asp?db=chl&gid=44354; http://www.gov.cn/english/laws/2005-10/09/content_75387.htm 
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8 Suggestions regard-
ing strengthening 
grassland protection 
and construction 
(Document 19, State 
Council)10
[continued]
2002 •	 Requires governments at various levels to control grassland deterioration, increase grassland 
production, and promote sustainable utilization of grasslands through:
1. Protection of so-called basic grassland (jiben caodi), which includes artificial pastures, im-
proved pastures, pastures where grass is harvested, and grasslands in natural reserves.
2. Maintenance of the balance between grass and livestock.
3. Promotion of rotational grazing and grazing bans (both short- and long-term) 
4. Intensification of fencing installation and irrigation works.
•	 Restoration of farmland (in particular, river source areas and sandstorm source areas) to grassland 
and the restoration of degraded grasslands.
9 Rural land Contract 
Law11
2002 •	 If during the term of contract, contractors settle into a small town, land use rights of the contrac-
tor should be reserved, or the contractor should be allowed to circulate (liuzhuan) the land con-
tracts and management rights (use rights); if during the term of contract, contractors move into 
an urban area and their rural residency is changed from non-rural to urban residency, the contract 
should be returned to the collective (Article 26). 
•	 Land use rights (tudi chengbao jingyingquan) may be circulated by subcontracts, leases, exchang-
es, transfers or other means (Article 32).
•	 The transfer of grassland to uses other pastoral production is prohibited (Article 32).
•	 The ownership and purpose of the land (agricultural production) should not be altered and the 
terms of the circulation may not exceed the remaining period of the term of the contract (Article 
33). 
•	 Charges for subcontracts, rent, and transfer should be determined by the two parties through 
consultation (Article 36).
•	 Article 57 stipulates that grasslands have to be utilized ‘appropriately.’
•	 Article 61 states that local government has to protect and monitor grasslands and to guide house-
holds in their utilization including feeding and cultivation, grazing, the number of livestock, 
rotation of grassland within the area, and extensive and intensive grazing. Article 62 stipulates 
that land reclamation is forbidden.
10 Technical codes of 
grazing bans12
2003 •	 Grazing bans less than one year are defined as xiumu while those lasting more than one year 
(usually several years) are defined as jinmu. Both xiumu and jinmu areas should be fenced ac-
cording to the following guidelines:
o xiumu should be applied to ban grazing during growing seasons (usually in spring and fall 
for 2-4 months) in order to remove the harmful effects of grazing on vegetation. 
o jinmu should be applied to pastures unsuitable for grazing derived from overgrazing in 
order to remove grazing pressure on vegetation and facilitate vegetation restoration and 
growth.
11 Notice regarding 
assigning tasks of 
implementing the 
tuimu huancao pro-
gram for 200313
2003 •	 First central government document on grazing removal project in which the term “tuimu huna-
cao” was used.
•	 States that 90 percent of the total usable grassland in China has been degraded due to both 
natural factors and overgrazing. States that the trend of overgrazing has not been fundamentally 
reversed, which has led to environmental problems (desertification, sandstorms, drying-up of 
rivers and lakes) and stagnating income among herders. Rangeland degradation hinders pastoral 
development and affects the sustainability of China’s socioeconomic development and threatens 
the country’s ecological security.
•	 Calls for the restoration of 1 billion mu of pastures, which accounts for 40 percent of the total de-
graded pastures in western China, in five years (2003-2008). Targets pastures in eastern Tibetan 
Plateau, particularly where important rivers originate. The TAR was not a target area in 2003.
9. Guowuyuan guanyu jiaqiang caoyuan baohu yu jianshe de ruogan yijian, http://www.xining.gov.cn/html/169/9861.html 
10. Guowuyuan guanyu jiaqiang caoyuan baohu yu jianshe de ruogan yijian, http://www.xining.gov.cn/html/169/9861.html 
11. Nongcun tudi chengbao fa, http://news.xinhuanet.com/zhengfu/2002-08/30/content_543847.htm,  http://www.gov.cn/english/2005-10/09/content_179389.
htm 
32 HIMALAYA  XXX (1-2) 2010
Law/Regulation Date Key Provisions
11 Notice regarding assigning 
tasks of implementing the 
tuimu huancao program for 
200313
[continued]
2003 •	 States that the grazing removal project should be implemented according to different 
local conditions.
•	 Outlines the tuimu huancao program as: 
1. fencing of existing pastures to ban grazing completely and permanently (fengyu), 
to cease grazing for several years (jinmu), to cease grazing for several months 
(xiumu)
2. rotational grazing (lunmu) 
3. reseeding of pastures 
4. promotion of pen-feeding (quanyang) 
5. adjustment of the number of livestock to the carrying capacity and maintenance 
of the balance between grass yields and livestock numbers. 
12 Notice regarding finishing 
tasks of implementing the 
tuimu huancao program for 
200414
2004 States that the grazing removal project (tuimu huancao) was going well but the installation 
of fences lagged behind partly due to the outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome 
(SARS). It reiterates the guideline for implementing the project (i.e., implementing the 
grassland household contract system, maintaining the balance between grass and livestock, 
controlling carrying capacities, etc.).
13 Notice on issuing detailed 
codes of evaluating the 
tuimu huancao program in 
the western region15
2004 •	 Details the standards and codes for evaluating grazing removal projects. The following 
elements should be examined including vegetation coverage, the availability and use 
of funding (especially matching funds by the local governments), budget management, 
pasture availability and quality of grain (feed allowance) as well as proposed project 
management (e.g., the bidding process).
•	 Government inspection team should consist of professionals from grassland depart-
ments, planning committees and financial departments as well as grain departments.
14 PRC Constitution16 2004 •	 Land can legally be taken by the state with compensation.
15 Land Administration Law17 2004 •	 Collectively owned land can be taken with state compensation for the sake of public 
interests (Article 2).
16 Regulation on management 
of rural land contracts and 
use rights circulation18
2005 •	 Herders are encouraged to take the following actions (Article 13):
a. Develop artificial fodder production centers.
b. Purchase fodder to increase supplies.
c. Raise livestock in pens with fodder in order to lessen grazing pressure on pastures.
d. Increase off-take rates and improve livestock herd structure.
e. Increase areas of pastures through transfer of grassland use rights.
f. Adopt any other means that help achieve the balance between grass and livestock.
•	 Stipulates that existing rural land uses (agricultural production) should not be altered 
and that the term of the circulation may not exceed the remaining period of the term of 
the contract (Article 3). 
•	 No organizations or individuals should force or prevent land users (farmers) from cir-
culating their land use rights (Article 6) or from claiming compensation, which should 
be paid to the land users (Article 7). 
•	 Herders are encouraged to seed pastures, reserve grass and fodder, improve breeds, 
raise livestock in pens, and increase off-take rates in order to lessen grazing pressure on 
natural grasslands (Article 7). 
•	 Grassland administrative departments of county governments are responsible for de-
termining specific carrying capacities according to the production of natural pastures, 
artificial pastures and fodder production centers in the previous 5 years, which will be 
updated every 5 years (Article 10).
12. Xiumu he jinmu jishu guicheng, http://www.ordosagri.gov.cn/tm/ShowArticle.asp?ArticleID=1833 
13. Guanyu xiada 2003 nian tuimu huancao renwu de tongzhi, http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2003/content_62103.htm
14. Quangu guanyu zuohao 2004 nian tuimu huancao gongzuo de tongzhi, http://www.scxmsp.gov.cn/news/Wenjzl/2008/117/08117135937AJ8FGCIF9296EA1
B0IA3.html 
15. Guanyu yinfa xibu diqu tianran caoyuan tuimu huancao gongcheng xiangmu yanshou xize de tongzhi, http://www.xjxmt.gov.cn/article.asp?id=2267
16. Xianfa (2004), http://www.law-lib.com/law/law_view.asp?id=82529; http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Constitution/node_2825.htm 
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17 Suggestions regarding an-
other step toward strength-
ening the implementation 
and management of tuimu 
huancao program19
2005 •	 States that ecological outcomes are the focus of the project while economic and social 
impacts should also be considered. 
•	 Where feed allowance is not paid or only partly paid, an investigation of the government 
officials responsible should be conducted.
18 Animal Husbandry Law20 2005 •	 Encourages efforts to intensify livestock systems in pastoral areas specifically through 
fencing propagation.
19 Regulations on mainte-
nance of forage and live-
stock balance21
2005 •	 Herders are encouraged to seed pastures, reserve grass and fodder, improve breeds, raise 
livestock in pens, and increase off-take rates in order to lessen grazing pressure on natural 
grasslands (Article 7).
•	 The Ministry of Agriculture is responsible for determining the standards for livestock car-
rying capacity (Article 8). 
•	 Grassland administrative departments of provincial or prefectural (municipal) govern-
ments are responsible for determining the specific standards for carrying capacity accord-
ing local conditions (Article 9). 
•	 Grassland administrative departments of county governments are responsible for de-
termining specific carrying capacities according to the production of natural pastures, 
artificial pastures and fodder production centers in the previous 5 years, which will be 
updated every 5 years (Article 10).
•	 States that ecological outcomes are the focus of the project while economic and social 
impacts should also be considered. 
•	 Where feed allowance is not paid or only partly paid, an investigation of the government 
officials responsible should be conducted.
20 Suggestions regard-
ing another step toward 
strengthening the imple-
mentation and management 
of the grazing removal 
project[continued]22
2005 •	 Gives a clear definition of the tuimu huancao project as a grassland development project 
that aims to restore grassland vegetation, improve grassland ecologies, enhance grassland 
productivity, and promote harmony between grassland ecologies and pastoral production 
through fencing, seeding, grazing bans and rotational grazing
•	 Suggests that livestock breeds and herd structure should be improved. In addition, 
off-take rates should be increased along with the commercialization of livestock produc-
tion in order to help herders change their production mode and to stabilize and enhance 
their incomes. Given these changes, the grazing bans and vegetation restoration can be 
sustained and the goal of improving grassland ecologies can be achieved.
•	 Suggests that jinmu (long-term grazing ban) should be implemented in severely degraded 
areas, xiumu (seasonal grazing bans) in moderately and slightly degraded areas, and rota-
tional grazing in areas with good vegetation. 
•	 Areas for grazing bans (xiumu/jinmu) should be within a county and the administrative 
village should be the unit for grazing bans. Responsibility for implementing the proj-
ect should be devolved to the township government while the provincial governments 
should take overall responsibility and the county government should take responsibility 
for implementing the project on the ground.
21 Cooperative Law 23 2006 •	 Provides the legal basis for the development of local groups. Groups can register as coop-
eratives rather than as companies as required in the past, notionally allowing the groups 
to more readily enter into contracts for inputs and marketing and to take out loans.
17. Tudi guanli fa (2004), http://www.gov.cn/flfg/2005-06/22/content_8505.htm 
18. Nongcun tudi chengbao jingying quan liuzhuan guanli banfa, http://www.chinacourt.org/flwk/show1.php?file_id=99323 
19. Guanyu jinyibu jiaqiang tuimu huancao gongcheng shishi guanli de yijian, http://www.myagri.gov.cn/new/view.asp?id=6035&typeid=55 
20. http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/misc/2006-06/28/content_342315.htm
21. Caoxu pingheng guanli banfa, http://www.xzq.gov.cn/nm/news_view.asp?newsid=120 
22. Guanyu jinyibu jiaqiang tuimu huancao gongcheng shishi guanli de yijian, http://www.myagri.gov.cn/new/view.asp?id=6035&typeid=55 
23. Nongmin zhuanye hezuoshe fa, http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2006-10/31/content_429182.htm
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22 Regulation on management 
and approval of grassland 
taking24
[continued]
2006 •	 Grassland administrative departments of county level (and above) governments are re-
sponsible for approving grassland-taking proposals (Article 3). 
•	 Grassland administrative departments of county level (and above) governments are re-
sponsible for approving grassland-taking proposals (Article 3).
•	 Grassland-taking of over 70 hectares for mineral resource exploitation and construction 
is subject to the approval of Ministry of Agriculture; less than 70 hectares is subject to the 
approval of grassland administrative departments of provincial governments (Article 6). 
•	 Temporary land-taking for construction projects, exploration, and tourism is subject 
to the approval of grassland administrative departments of county level (and above) 
governments. Temporary land-taking cannot exceed a period of two years and permanent 
buildings should not be established and the grassland should be returned in time and 
vegetation should be restored (Article 7).
23 Property Law25 2007 •	 Land ownership (Article 42, 48, 59, 60) along with land contracts and management rights 
remain the same as in the land administrative law (2004) as well as the “Regulation on 
Management of Rural Land Use Rights Circulation” (2005).
24 Notice regarding speeding 
up implementing grass-
land household contract 
system26
2007 •	 Reiterates that the household contract system for grasslands aims to further (1) create 
incentives for herders to protect and invest in grasslands; (2) change patterns of pasto-
ral production (from extensive grazing on natural grassland to a system combining the 
raising of livestock in pens with fodder, rotational grazing, and seasonal grazing bans 
(3) control grassland desertification (inhibit overgrazing and maintain a balance of grass 
yields and livestock numbers).
•	 States that grassland vegetation should be restored and that the productivity of natural 
pastures should be enhanced through grazing bans and rotational grazing, which will cre-
ate conditions for changing current patterns of pastoral production system.
•	 The transfer of grassland use rights is allowed so long as the subcontracted grasslands are 
still used for pastoral production.
25 General plans for grassland 
protection, development 
(jianshe) and use27  
2007 •	 Suggests that specific programs on the ground should include grassland enclosure, grass-
land improvement, artificial pasture establishment, the raising of livestock scientifically, 
livestock breed improvement, grazing bans and rotational grazing
•	 For the Tibetan Plateau, the general goal is to restore grassland ecosystems and grassland 
vegetation, protect river sources and biodiversity, and improve herders’ production and 
living conditions (housing conditions, livestock shelters and pens, fodder bases, sheds, 
drinking water for people and livestock). The specific goals and methods are: 
o grassland enclosure (by 2010, 28 million hectares of fenced pastures), seeding, graz-
ing bans and rotational grazing;
o rodent control;
o protection of unique grassland resources on the plateau; 
o housing improvement. 
24. Caoyuan zhengzhanyong shenhe shenpi guanli banfa, http://www.chinacourt.org/flwk/show1.php?file_id=108167 
25. Wuquan fa, http://www.gov.cn/flfg/2007-03/19/content_554452.htm 
26. Nongyebu guanyu jiakuai tuijin caoyuan jiating chengbaozhi de tongzhi, http://www.moa.gov.cn/sjzz/xumusi/fagui/201006/t20100606_1534926.htm 
27. Quanguo cao yuan baohu jianshe liyong zongti guihua, http://www.forestry.gov.cn/uploadfile/main/2010-11/file/2010-11-26-e1c16284c5aa4fa396c2756a4d
3a9971.pdf  
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26 Resolution on certain im-
portant questions concern-
ing the implementation of 
rural reform and develop-
ment28
2008 •	 The household contract system and the current land tenure system should remain 
unchanged for the long term and the scale of land-taking should be reduced even as the 
mechanisms of compensation for land-taking are improved.
•	 Farmers are allowed to circulate (liuzhuan) land contracts and management rights with 
compensation through various means (subcontract, lease, exchange, transfer, and joining 
collective cooperation) on a voluntary basis but the ownership and the use of the land 
(agricultural production) must not be altered when the contracts and management rights 
of the land are circulated.
27 Notice regarding strength-
ening the management of 
and services related to the 
circulation (liuzhuan) of 
rural land contracts and 
management rights29
2008 •	 Emphasizes that collective ownership (common property) of rural land and existing uses 
of land for agricultural production should not be altered. It stipulates that the farmer 
should have the final say about whether their contracts and management rights should be 
transferred and through which means.
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